Tort Law - Intoxicating Liquors - Minors - Social Hosts - Universities - National Fraternities by Bresch, Jeffrey J.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 29 Number 2 Article 9 
1991 
Tort Law - Intoxicating Liquors - Minors - Social Hosts - 
Universities - National Fraternities 
Jeffrey J. Bresch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey J. Bresch, Tort Law - Intoxicating Liquors - Minors - Social Hosts - Universities - National 
Fraternities, 29 Duq. L. Rev. 357 (1991). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol29/iss2/9 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
TORT LAW-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-MINORS-SocIAL HOSTS-
UNIVERSITIES-NATIONAL FRATERNITIEs-The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that, absent allegations of "knowingly furnish-
ing" alcohol to minors, neither university nor national fraternity
could be held liable for property damages incurred as a result of a
fire allegedly started by a minor student who was served alcoholic
beverages at party held in university dormitory and of party
hosted by local chapter of fraternity.
Alumni Association v Sullivan, - Pa -, 572 A2d 1209
(1990).
On December 7, 1983, appellant Ronald C. Unterberger, a then
eighteen-year-old college freshman at Bucknell University, at-
tended two parties.' The first party was held in his freshman dor-
mitory, and the second party was hosted by the Kappa Chapter of
Sigma Chi Fraternity.2 Unterberger (hereinafter, appellant) openly
consumed alcohol, despite his minor status, and had become visi-
bly intoxicated.' As a result of the intoxication, the appellant and
another student accidently set fire to a neighboring fraternity
house.' The destruction of this structure resulted in a civil claim
brought by the damaged property owner.5 The appellant filed a
joinder complaint which alleged that the additional defendants,
Sigma Chi, Kappa Chapter of Sigma Chi, and Bucknell University,
were negligent in providing him with the alcoholic beverages. 6 The
1. Alumni Association v Sullivan, - Pa -, 572 A2d 1209 (1990).
2. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1210.
3. Alumni Association v Sullivan, 369 Pa Super 596, 535 A2d 1095, 1097 (1987).
4. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1097. The other student, Van Kingsley Sullivan, also a minor,
was co-defendant in the civil action filed on August 16, 1985, by the Alumni Association,
Delta Zeta Zeta of Lambda Chi Alpha, owner of the damaged property. Id. Alumni associa-
tion alleged that the two minors negligently caused or failed to control a fire that resulted in
over $400,000 in damage. Id.
On October 18, 1985, appellant had writs of summons issued to join, as additional defend-
ants, Sigma Chi, Kappa Chapter of Sigma Chi, and Bucknell University. Id.
On November 8, 1985, appellant filed a joinder complaint against the parties which the
writs of summons were issued against. Id.
The joinder complaint, which is the focus of the appellate review, will be discussed more
fully in the body of this note.
5. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1097.
6. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1210. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permit a
defendant to join any additional defendants who may alone be liable or liable to (the origi-
nal defendant] on the cause of action declared upon by the plaintiff. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
357
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appellant further alleged that the negligent acts of each defendant
proximately resulted in the conduct which caused the fire.7 Each of
the additional defendants filed a preliminary objection.8
Trial Judge, James McClure, Jr." sustained the preliminary ob-
jections filed by defendant Bucknell University and dismissed the
complaint filed by appellant against Bucknell as an additional
defendant.10
The preliminary objections of additional defendant Sigma Chi
2252 (Purdon 1987).
The Rules also allow for joinder when the joined party may be liable to the joining party
on any cause of action arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions upon
which the plaintiff's cause of action is based. Id. Presumably, appellant joined the additional
defendants on the theory that the additional defendants' actions (see note 7 for allegations)
were negligent, and additional defendants were alone liable on the cause of action declared
by the plaintiff. (See Brief of Defendant Ronald C. Unterberger in Opposition to Additional
Defendants' Preliminary Objections at 27-8).
7. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1210. Appellant's complaint alleged that: (1) Kappa Chapter,
in furnishing alcoholic beverages to appellant, a minor, created a known foreseeable risk, in
that minors are presumed to be incompetent to handle the effects of alcohol; and thereby
making Kappa Chapter liable for the damage negligently caused while the appellant was
intoxicated;(2) Sigma Chi, as owner of the Kappa Chapter house, knew or should have
known alcohol was being served to minors at Kappa Chapter Fraternity parties, yet allowed
the conduct to continue, and was therefore liable for the fire damage caused by the appel-
lant; (3) Bucknell, through it counselors, employees and agents knew or should have known
that alcoholic beverages were being served to minors at a private, freshmen dormitory, yet
permitted the conduct to continue, and was therefore liable for the fire damage caused by
the appellant. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1097.
8. Id. Preliminary objections are governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: A preliminary objection is a pleading, requesting the court to rule on the validity of
the pleading objected to. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1028 (Purdon 1987).
9. Judge McClure has since been appointed to the federal district bench in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania.
10. Alumni Association v Sullivan, No 407, 1985, slip op (Court of Common Pleas,
Civil Division, Union County (1987)). In sustaining the objection, the court (citing Congini v
Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa 157, 470 A2d 515 (1983)) refused to extend tort liability to
Bucknell for knowingly permitting alcohol to be served to, and consumed by, minors on
Bucknell property, in the absence of allegations that the additional defendant acted as a
"social host". Id at 1. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court recognized (citing Burk-
hart v Brockway Glass Company, 352 Pa Super 204, 507 A2d 844 (1986)), for liability pur-
poses, three categories of persons who serve alcohol: (1) [Tjhose persons engaged in the
manufacturing, importation, sale and disposition of liquor, alcohol and malt or brewed bev-
erages who are required to be licensed pursuant to the liquor code, 47 PS § 1-101; (2) those
social hosts, i.e., non-licensed persons, who serve intoxicants for no remuneration to their
adult guests and (3) those social hosts who knowingly serve intoxicants to a minor. Id at n.
1.
The trial court concluded that there were no allegations that Bucknell University, a non-
licensee, acted as a "social host," or in any way provided alcoholic beverages for the original
defendant Unterberger. Id. The court acknowledged this area of law to be complex and
recognized that such pervasive social problems were better left to the legislature for resolu-
tion. Id.
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fraternity, in the nature of a demurrer," was sustained" and the
complaint of appellant against Sigma Chi Fraternity, as an addi-
tional defendant, was dismissed.1 The preliminary objection of ad-
ditional defendant Kappa Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity was
sustained, and the complaint of original defendant Unterberger
against Kappa Chapter of Sigma Chi, as an additional defendant,
was dismissed."
The decision of the trial court was appealed to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania.'5 Upon review, the superior court affirmed
the dismissal of appellees Sigma Chi and Bucknell, but reversed
and reinstated the joinder complaint against appellee Kappa
Chapter of Sigma Chi.' e
In affirming the dismissal of Sigma Chi and Bucknell, the court
agreed with the trial court's interpretation of Congini v Porter-
11. A demurrer is an allegation of the defendant, admitting the matters of fact al-
leged by the complaint to be true, which provides that the facts set forth in the complaint
are insufficient for the plaintiff to proceed with the complaint. Black's Law Dictionary 389
(West, 5th ed 1979).
12. Alumni, No 407, 1985, slip op at n. 2. The objection of the claim against Sigma
Chi was sustained for the same reasons Bucknell's objection was sustained. Id. In fact, the
court, in sustaining this objection, merely referred back to that portion of the opinion which
rationalized the decision regarding Bucknell's objection. Id. The court concluded that a por-
tion of the preliminary objection by additional defendant Sigma Chi, regarding personal
jurisdiction, was deemed withdrawn because counsel for Sigma Chi conceded personal juris-
diction at oral argument. Id.
13. Id.
14. Alumni, No 407, 1985, slip op at n. 3. The objection presented by the Kappa
Chapter was in three counts: Counts I and II were in the nature of a demurrer, and Count
III was in the nature of a motion to strike. Id. Counts I and .II were sustained, thereby
rendering Count III, moot. Id. In considering the preliminary objection, the trial court found
sufficient allegations, (i.e.- that the Kappa Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity held a lease on
the premises where alcoholic beverages were served by members of the Kappa Chapter), to
place additional defendant Kappa Chapter in the category of "social host". Id at n. 3.
Citing Zanine v Gallagher, 345 Pa Super 119, 497 A2d 1332 (1985) and Palsgraf v Long
Island Railroad, 248 NY 339, 162 NE 99 (1928), the court held that a local college fraternity
chapter, acting as a "social host," has no legal duty to protect another fraternity from the
risk that a minor college student served alcohol will negligently set fire to another fraternity
house. Alumni, No 407, 1985, slip op at n. 3.
After establishing lack of "proximate cause", the court, citing Congini, (cited in note 10),
held that a social host who serves alcoholic beverages to a minor can only be held liable for
the foreseeable tortious acts of the minor. Id.
15. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1097. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, the trial judge submitted a supplemental opinion in support of the trial court's origi-
nal Order. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1925(a)(Purdon 1990). The support opinion reviewed the
previous order and addressed the insignificance of Fassett v Poch, 625 F Supp 324 (E D Pa
1985), a case that was cited in the original order of the trial court, and was subsequently
reversed on appeal, in Fassett v Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F2d 1150 (3d Cir 1986). Alumni
Association v Sullivan, No 407 (1985) Opinion Under Pa R A P § 1925.
16. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1097.
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sville Valve Co." The superior court also agreed with the finding
of the trial court that Congini articulated a narrow exception to
the general rule against social host liability, and was only intended
to extend liability to those persons who knowingly serve or furnish
alcohol to minors.'5 The superior court was unwilling to extend lia-
bility to Bucknell and Sigma Chi, when there were no allegations
that either Bucknell or Sigma Chi furnished the alcohol in ques-
tion, or willfully and wantonly inflicted injury upon appellant.'"
With respect to appellee Kappa Chapter, the superior court re-
jected the trial court's analysis and held that the presented allega-
tions were insufficient to sustain the preliminary objection of addi-
tional defendant Kappa Chapter.2 0 Whether the serving of alcohol
by appellee Kappa Chapter was the proximate cause of the damag-
ing fire was, according to the superior court, a question for jury
consideration; and therefore, the preliminary objection should have
been denied."1
The dismissal of Kappa Chapter by the trial court was reversed,
and the superior court reinstated the joinder claim as to Kappa
Chapter.2
17. Id. In Congini, see note 10 for cite, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, for the
first time, imposed liability upon an adult social host who served intoxicating liquors to a
minor. See notes 75-78, and accompanying text, for a fuller discussion of Congini.
18. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1097 (emphasis in original). In finding for the appellees
Sigma Chi and Bucknell, the superior court quoted Congini pertaining to what conduct
forms the basis of a cause of action for social host liability:
Under our analysis, an actor's negligence exists in furnishing intoxicants to a class of
persons legislatively determined to be incompetent to handle its effects. It is the per-
son's service which forms the basis of the cause of action ....
Id (citing Congini, 470 A2d at 518 (emphasis supplied by the court)).
19. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1099. Appellant's sole allegation against these appellees was
that they were aware, or should have been aware, that alcohol was being served to minors at
the respective social gatherings. Id at 1100. The court concluded that these allegations did
not set forth a viable cause of action. Id.
20. Id at 1100-01. Judge Brosky, writing for the superior court, stated that while the
more reasonably foreseeable consequences of an intoxicated minor might involve the break-
ing of windows and other destructive acts, this does not preclude a finding that fire was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of appellant's intoxication. Id at 1100. Citing Mas-
ciangelo v Dolent, 222 Pa Super 368, 295 A2d 98,99 (1972), the court restated the well set-
tled notion that the peculiar way in which an injury may result is not material to a finding
of foreseeabiity. Alumni, 535 A2d at 1100.
21. Id at 1101. After finding a duty to exist, as a social host, as to additional defend-
ant Kappa Chapter, the superior court held that the trial court should not have determined
that additional defendant Kappa Chapter, in serving alcohol to the appellant, was not the
proximate cause of the fire as a matter of law. Id. Therefore, on review, the court found
error in the trial court's finding that the facts, as pled by the appellant, failed to state a




Appellant appealed that portion of the decision of the superior
court which held, absent any allegation that appellee Sigma Chi
and appellee Bucknell served or furnished alcohol to the minor Ap-
pellant, that no claim could be sustained against these two addi-
tional defendants. 3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the
superior court."4 Chief Justice Nix'5 formulated the issue before
the court as whether, under Pennsylvania Law, authority exists for
finding a cause of action against Bucknell and/or Sigma Chi.2 Ap-
plying the Congini requirements, which imposed liability to those
who serve alcohol to minors, the court refused to broadly interpret
the Congini standard of "knowingly furnishing" intoxicants to
mean "should have known. 27 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
relied heavily on case precedent.28
In holding that there existed no valid claim against either
Bucknell or Sigma Chi, the court discussed the need for a breach
of duty in order to sustain any tort action.2 ' The court found no
duty to exist.30 After discussing the relationships a University and
a fraternity have with their respective groups, the supreme court
was unpersuaded that liability should be imposed upon these two
entities." The court feared that imposing pecuniary liability would
23. Id. Kappa Chapter was not a party to the appeal before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1210, n. 1. The Kappa Chapter did not appeal the deci-
sion of the superior court. Id. Therefore, since the Kappa Chapter did not appeal, the ques-
tion of whether the social host's liability should be extended to damages sustained by third
parties as a result of the intoxicated minor's negligent actions was not addressed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id.
24. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1209.
25. Id. Justices Flaherty, McDermott and Zappala joined in the majority opinion. Id.
Justices Larsen and Papadakos, JJ. concurred in the result, but did not file separate opin-
ions. Id at 1213.
26. Id at 1210.
27. Id at 1212. The supreme court rejected the Appellant's argument that the "know-
ingly furnished" standard was too restrictive; and that the standard should be "knew or
should have known." Id.
28. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1212, (citing Congini v Porterhouse Valve Co., see note 10 for
cite, and Orner v Mallick, 515 Pa 132, 527 A2d 521 (1987)).
29. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1210-11. The court cited Marshall v Port Authority of Alle-
gheny County, - Pa -, 568 A2d 931 (1990); Morena v South Hills Health System,
501 Pa 634, 462 A2d 680 (1983), and Boyce v United States Steel, 446 Pa 226, 285 A2d 459
(1971), which all stand for the fundamental tort law principle that, in order to bring a cause
of action based in negligence, a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, must be
breached. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1211. The court found no such duty. Id.
30. Id. The supreme court held that neither Bucknell, nor Sigma Chi, owed appellant
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impede these groups from fulfilling their role of promoting aca-
demic and personal growth in the youth."' Specifically, the in-
creased cost which would ensue to such bodies, was a concern for
the court, because the increase in cost could seriously impede the
mission of these institutions which is to develop the youth."3
While the court empathized with the victims and their families
in tragic, alcohol related situations, the court could not justify a
sweeping change of existing law, with no statistical basis to support
such a change."
At common law it was not a tort to either sell or give intoxicat-
ing liquor to ordinary able-bodied men.3 5 The common law ration-
ale for the rule of non-liability was that the drinking of the liquor,
not the furnishing of it, was the proximate cause of the injury. 6
There was, however, a common law exception which imposed lia-
bility on one who furnished liquor to a person who was in a condi-
tion as to be deprived of his will power or responsibility for his
behavior.
7
In 1854, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted an act which per-
mitted civil recovery against any person who furnished alcohol to
certain designated groups of people.3e Section 3 of the 1854 Act
32. Id at 1213. In discussing the modern perception of relationships between Univer-
sities and their students, and the respective relationship of fraternities, the court was un-




35. 45 Am Jur 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969). See generally, Annotation, Com-
mon-Law Rule of Action for Damage Sustained by Plaintiff in Consequences of Sale or
Gift of Intoxicating Liquor or Habit-Forming Drug to Another, 97 ALR 3d 528, 533 (1980).
See, 48A CJS Intoxicating Liquors § 428, at 133-34 (1981)(non-liability based on consump-
tion as proximate cause).
36. 45 Am Jur 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969). This common law rule was ap-
plied in Ranochia v Reliance Ins Co. of Philadelphia, 65 Lack Jur 29, 33 D & C 2d 531
(1964), where the seller of liquor was not liable to either the purchaser or a third party for
injuries resulting from the purchaser's intoxication based on the belief that the consumption
was the proximate cause of the subsequent injuries.(Commonly labelled the "Consumption
Theory"), see Case note, Mathews v Koniecznyi 61 Temple L Rev 643 (1988).
Commentators have suggested that the consumption theory was a product of a strong
Protestant social ethic that a person should bear the consequences of his acts. Comment,
Social Host Liability in Pennsylvania Coherent Policy or "Judicial Gymnastics" (hereinaf-
ter quoted as, "Comment, Social Host Liability in Pennsylvania") 90 Dickinson L Rev 509
(1985), (citing Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14 Santa Clara L Rev 46,48
(1973)).
37. 30 Am Jur Intoxicating Liquors § 520 (1958).
38. Act of May 8, 1854, No. 648, § 3, 1854 Pa Laws 663 (repealed 47 Pa Cons Stat
Ann § 9-901 (Purdon 1969)). The groups protected by this act were: any person of known
intemperate habits, minors, insane persons, and any person who is drunk or intoxicated. Id.
362
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held the violator civilly liable for any injuries, personal or real,39
which were proximately caused by the furnishing of alcohol.40 As a
general rule, Dram Shop Acts were aimed at licensees, and not so-
cial hosts.
4'
In 1861, the first case ultimately decided by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania involving a violation of the Act of 1854, was Fink
v Garman.42 In Fink, a widow brought an action against a public-
house keeper to recover damages for having caused the death of
her husband, by unlawfully furnishing him with intoxicating li-
quors.4 ' The widow alleged that the innkeeper willfully furnished
her husband intoxicating drinks as a beverage; that the husband
was intoxicated at the time; and that as a result of the furnishing
of alcohol, the husband fell from his wagon and was killed by the
wagon's wheel." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the
Act of 1854 and public policy, held that the widow could maintain
an action against the innkeeper for damages which resulted from
the innkeeper's negligent act of furnishing liquor to the husband
while he was in an intoxicated condition.4'
The Pennsylvania State Legislature enacted the Pennsylvania
Liquor Code in 1951.'" Among various other provisions, the Liquor
Code, specifically section 4-493(1), provides five different groups of
people to whom it is "unlawful" for licensees to sell liquor.'7 After
This Act, similar to many other states, was labelled Dram Shop Acts or Civil Damages Acts.
See generally, McGough, Dram Shop Acts, 1967 ABA Sec of Ins Negli & Compensation 448.
A "dram shop" is: "a drinking establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk on the
premises; a bar or saloon. Black Law Dictionary 444 (West, 5th ed 1979). Black's defines a
"Dram Shop Act" as: an act "which imposes liability on the seller of intoxicating liquors
... when a third party is injured as a result of the intoxication of the buyer where the sale
has caused or contributed to such intoxication." Id.
39. The expression "personal or real" refers to either injuries to a person or to
property.
40. 1854 Pa Laws 663, cited at note 38.
41. See Case note, Mathews v Konieczny, 515 Pa 106, 527 A2d 508 (1987). 26 Du-
quesne L Rev 793, (1988) at 799, (citing Edgar v Kajet, 84 Misc 2d 100, 375 NYS 2d 548
(NY Sup Ct 1975), aflrd mem, 55 AD 2d 597, 389 NYS 2d 631 (NY App Div 1976)(New
York Dram Shop Act applies only to commercial licensees)).
42. 40 Pa 95 (1861).
43. Fink, 40 Pa at 96.
44. Id at 98-9.
45. Id. The court supported the holding by evidence that the innkeeper knew that
the husband had intemperate habits and knew that the husband was intoxicated but contin-
ued to serve him. Id at 104. The court upheld the lower court's finding of the innkeeper's
liability. Id.
46. Act of April 12, 1951, No. 179, 151 Pa Law 90 (codified as amended at 47 Pa Stat
Ann §§ 1-101 to 796 (Purdon 1969 & Supp 1987)).
47. 47 Pa Stat Ann § 4-493(1). This section states, inter alia, that:
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the enactment of the Liquor Code, the most prevalent method of
imposing civil liability was through a negligence action based on
Liquor Control Statutes.'8 The Liquor Code created a duty to pro-
tect the general public from damages inherent in serving alcohol to
high-risk persons." The violation of the statute constitutes a
breach of duty, and both the intoxication and injury are generally
held to be reasonably foreseeable."
In the landmark case of Rappaport v Nichols," the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a tavern owner, who served intoxi-
cating beverages to a minor, in violation of a state prohibitory stat-
ute, was liable for injuries suffered by a third person in a traffic
accident caused by the intoxicated minor."
In 1958, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in McKinney v
Foster,5 3 held that injuries to third parties are foreseeable results
of serving alcohol to a minor, and that a commercial licensee may
be held liable for injuries proximately caused by the minor's
intoxication."
In Smith v Clark," Pennsylvania's highest court directly ad-
dressed the limits of a civil action based upon a violation of Liquor
Code Section 493(1), with respect to minors."
[It shall be unlawful] (1)[flor any licensee. or any other person, to sell, furnish or
give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages. . to any person visibly intoxicated, or
to any insane person, or to any minor, or to any habitual drunkard, or persons of
known intemperate habits.
Id.
48. See Comment, Social Host Liability in Pennsylvania, at 514, (cited in note 36),
(citing Comment, Negligence Actions Against Liquor Purveyors: Filling the Gap in South
Dakota, 23 SD L Rev 228,240 (1978). See also, Case note, Hutchens v Hawkins, 303 SE2d
584 (NC Ct App 1983), 22 Duquesne L Rev 1105, 1114 (1984).
49. Comment, Social Host Liability in Pennsylvania, at 504 (cited in note 36); citing
Graham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligence Acts of Intoxi-
cated Guests, 16 Willamette L Rev 561, (1980), 569-70.
50. Comment, Social Host Liability in Pennsylvania, at 515 (cited in note 36), (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288 B (1965), which provides that "[tihe unexcused viola-
tion of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court
as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man is negligence in itself.")
51. 31 NJ 188, 156 A2d 1 (1959).
52. Rappaport, 156 A2d at 1 (emphasis added). The New Jersey Supreme Court
noted that "where a tavern keeper sells alcoholic beverages to a person who is visibly intoxi-
cated or to a person he knows or should have known from the circumstances to be a minor,
he ought to be recognized and foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others." Id at 8. The
court concluded that service to an intoxicated person or a minor may also constitute com-
mon law negligence. Id.
53. 391 Pa 221, 137 A2d 502 (1958).
54. Foster, 137 A2d at 504.
55. 411 Pa 142, 190 A2d 441 (1963).
56. Smith, 190 A2d at 442.
Recent Decisions
In Smith, the plaintiff, a minor, after being served alcohol at the
defendant's bar, drove his car off the road and was seriously in-
jured. Defendant continued to serve plaintiff alcohol even after
the plaintiff had reached a state of visible intoxication." In holding
that the defendant would be liable to the plaintiff if his injuries
were found to be the proximate cause of furnishing alcohol, the
court determined that the furnishing of alcohol to the plaintiff vio-
lated the statute in two respects.5'
In Smith, the court ultimately held that a violation of the Li-
quor Code by merely serving alcohol to a minor, regardless of
whether the minor was visibly intoxicated when served, could
render a licensee liable when the plaintiff could prove that the vio-
lation constituted the proximate cause of the injury.10
In 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was confronted with
the issue of whether to create a duty which would support civil
liability against a social host for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxi-
cated guest. 1 In Manning,"2 the court through a per curiam opin-
ion, 8 expressly declined to use the provisions of the Liquor Code
to create liability for a non-licensee who furnishes alcohol for no
remuneration." In Manning, an employee became intoxicated dur-
ing a party hosted by the employer for the employee, during which
the employer furnished intoxicating liquors, and as a result of his
state of intoxication, the employee was involved in an automobile
accident resulting in injuries to the passenger-plaintiff in the em-
ployee's vehicle." The court dismissed the complaint, relying on
Jardine v Upper Darby Lodge," which held that only licensed per-
sons engaged in the sale of intoxicants have been held civilly liable
to injured parties. 7
57. Id.
58. Id. The Supreme Court indicated that there was ample evidence to sustain the
finding of the trial jury that the minor was served, although he was already visibly intoxi-
cated. Id.
59. Id. The Court determined that the actions of the defendant violated both the
provision of serving a minor, as well as serving a visibly intoxicated person. Id.
60. Id at 443.
61. Manning v Andy, 454 Pa 237, 310 A2d 75 (1973).
62. Manning, 310 A2d at 75.
63. Black's Law Dictionary defines "per curiam" as: a "[p]hrase used to distinguish
an opinion of the whole court from an opinion written by any one judge [or justice]."
Black's Law Dictionary 1023 (West, 5th ed 1979).
64. Manning, 310 A2d at 76.
65. Id at 75.
66. 413 Pa 626, 198 A2d 550 (1969).
67. Manning, 310 A2d at 76. The court also relied on section 493(1) of the Liquor
Code which the court interpreted not to impose liability upon the employer. (See note 47 for
1991 365
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In 1983, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Klein v Rays-
ingeri and Congini v Portersville Valve Co.6' which directly af-
fected the liability of social hosts in Pennsylvania. 0
In Klein, a motorist and passenger of a vehicle, which was struck
by a vehicle operated by an intoxicated driver, brought two sepa-
rate actions 71 against the intoxicated driver and the social hosts
who served the adult driver alcoholic beverages." Each action was
based on negligence of the social host in allegedly serving one or
more alcoholic beverages to the adult guest, when the guest was
visibly intoxicated.7 3 The majority74 in Klein held that a social host
who served alcoholic beverages to an adult guest was not liable for
the injuries of the adult guest, nor the injuries of a third party7 5.
In Congini,7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enforced a cause
of action against a social host for serving intoxicating liquors to the
point of intoxication to persons less than 21 years of age.77 In Con-
gini, a minor, who was injured in an automobile accident following
a party where he was allegedly served intoxicating liquors to the
point of intoxication, brought a personal injury action against the
social host.
7 8
In enforcing a cause of action against a social host, the supreme
court required that the host must "knowingly furnish" intoxicants
relevant parts of section 493(1) of the Liquor Code).
68. 504 Pa 141, 470 A2d 507 (1983).
69. 504 Pa 157, 470 A2d 515 (1983).
70. Both Klein, cited in note 68, and Congini, cited in note 69, were argued on Octo-
ber 26, 1983 and decided on December 30, 1983.
71. The appeal before the Supreme Court involved the consolidation of the personal
injury actions, wrongful death action, and a survival action of those parties involved. Klein,
470 A2d at 508.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Klein, 470 A2d at 507. In a 5-2 decision, Justice McDermott provided the opinion
for the majority which was comprised of Justices McDermott, Nix, Flaherty, Hutchison and
Zappala. Id. Then Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Larsen both filed dissenting opinions.
Id at 511. Then Chief Justice Roberts proposed to impose liability based upon section
493(1) of the Liquor Code. Id. Justice Roberts believed the language of section 493(1), spe-
cifically "any other person", should apply to social hosts. Id.
75. Id.
76. See note 69 for cite.
77. Congini, 470 A2d at 518.
78. Id at 516. The parents brought a negligence action on behalf of the minor, as well
as on their own behalf. Id. The negligence claim stated three forms of negligence: 1) Negli-
gence in serving alcohol to the point of intoxication; 2) negligence in handing the minor car
keys when the social host knew the minor was intoxicated and would be driving; and 3)




Within a year, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was applying
the Congini ruling.80 In Fassett v Delta Kappa Epsilon,8 the
Third Circuit drew from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's hold-
ing in ConginiN and concluded in order for a social host to be held
liable to either the guest or a third party, the host's conduct must
be a "substantial assistance." 8
In Fassett, actions were brought for the death of one passenger
and the serious injuries to another, after a minor, who had con-
sumed intoxicating beverages at a college fraternity party, was in-
volved in an auto accident." The Third Circuit held that a sub-
stantial issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant
intentionally rendered substantial assistance to the minor driver in
his consumption of intoxicants.8"
Less than a year after Fassett, the Third Circuit reiterated the
reasoning of Fassett in Macleary v Hines." Macleary developed
the rule that a social host must have "intentionally and substan-
tially aided and encouraged the consumption of alcohol by a minor
79. Id at 518. While the court was willing to recognize that a minor may state a cause
of action against an adult social host who knowingly served the minor intoxicants, the court
was quick to provide that the social host may in turn assert, as a defense, that the minor
was contributorily negligent. Id. Thereafter, under Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence
Act (Act of April 28, 1978, PL 202, No 53, § 10 (89), as amended October 5, 1980, PL, No
142, § 222(a), 42 Pa Cons Stat § 7102 (Purdon Supp 1987)) it will remain for the finder of
fact to resolve whether the defendant host's negligence was such as to allow recovery. Con-
gini, 470 A2d at 518-19. For a comprehensive discussion of Pennsylvania's Comprehensive
Negligence Act see, Comment, The Presumption of Due Care and the Law of Comparative
Negligence (Pennsylvania), 34 Villanova L Rev 697 (1989); Lewin, Comparative Nuisance,
50 U Pitt L Rev 1009 (1989).
80. See Douglas v Schwenk, 330 Pa Super 392, 479 A2d 608 (1984). Administrator of
passenger's estate brought suit against minor negligent operator and joined host, who alleg-
edly served alcohol knowing minor was underage and would be driving an automobile. The
court permitted the joinder and required the finder of fact to determine who furnished alco-
hol to the driver. Douglas, 479 A2d at 612.
81. 807 F2d 1150 (3d Cir 1986).
82. The Third Circuit also relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1977),
which provides: in situations were liability attaches to an actor who harms a third party by
acting in concert with another, that in order to impose liability the assistance given must be
substantial. See Fassett, 807 F2d at 1162-63.
83. Id.
84. Id at 1152-54.
85. Id at 1164. The court reversed and remanded to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, based upon its determination that there were still
substantial issues of material fact outstanding which precluded the district court's initial
summary judgment. Fassett, 807 F2d at 1164.
86. 817 F2d 1081 (3d Cir 1987).
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guest. .... "I"
In Macleary, a minor passenger, who was injured in an automo-
bile accident after he and the driver had both become intoxicated
at a party, brought a personal injury action against the social host
for negligently furnishing the minors with intoxicating liquors.6 ,
The court of appeals, per Judge Mansmann, held that whether so-
cial host's negligence in aiding or encouraging a minor's consump-
tion was a substantial cause of minor's injuries, presented a factual
question and precluded the district court's directed verdict.89 The
circuit court vacated the lower court's Order and remanded the
case. 9"
In the same year the Third Circuit handed down Fassett, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further explained the standard of
care owed by a social host to their minor guests in Orner v Mal-
lick.91 In Orner, a minor who was injured when he fell from a sec-
ond floor hotel balcony, brought an action against the two social
hosts of high school graduation parties and the hotel which served
him intoxicating liquors.
92
The supreme court rejected the lower court's narrow interpreta-
tion of Congini, which stated that in order for a social host to be
held liable, there must be an averment that the social host served
alcohol to a minor "to the point of intoxication.""19 The supreme
court held that an adult owes a duty of care to minor guests and
any furnishing of alcohol is a breach of that duty, regardless of the
amount served."
Until 1983, Pennsylvania courts had refused to impose liability
on social hosts who served alcohol to minors. However, on Decem-
ber 30, 1983,95 in Klein and Congini, Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court interpreted the Crimes Code" as imposing a duty on social
87. Macleary, 817 F2d at 1084.
88. Id at 1082.
89. Id at 1085.
90. Id.
91. 515 Pa 132, 527 A2d 521 (1987).
92. Orner, 527 A2d at 522-23.
93. Id at 523.
94. Id at 524. The supreme court did recognize that the issue of whether the social
host was responsible for the minor's intoxication is important; the court found it to be a
question of causation, and not whether the defendant had a duty, which was breached. Id.
In Orner v Mallick, (cited in note 91), the issue of causation was a pleaded fact, and any
inquiry into whether the actions of the social host caused plaintiff's injuries was not re-
quired at that juncture. Id. The cause was remanded. Id.
95. See note 70.
96. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code is the Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No.
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hosts who serve alcohol to minors.97
In Congini, the supreme court interpreted section 6308 of the
Crimes Code, in conjunction with section 306, to impose liability
upon an adult who furnishes liquor to a minor, on the theory that
the adult was acting as an accomplice to the minor's offensive
act."' The significant standard developed through judicial interpre-
tation" was that in order to impose liability, the host must "know-
ingly furnish" intoxicants to a minor. "Knowingly furnish" has
been interpreted to mean "render substantial assistance," as well
as possess actual knowledge of the minority's actions. 100
In Alumni Association v Sullivan, the student appellant con-
tended that the "knowingly furnish" standard should be accorded
a broad interpretation and proposed the standard should provide
for a cause of action which arises against a party who allegedly
"should have known" that alcohol was provided to minors on the
premises.' 10
The "knowingly furnish" standard requires that the social host
have actual knowledge of the minor's activity, as opposed to im-
puted knowledge resulting from the host-guest relationship, which
the "should have known" standard proposes.
1 0
2
Courts are reluctant to enumerate what conduct would consti-
tute knowingly furnishing alcohol; however, it appears as though
any involvement in the planning or funding, or any knowledge of
the degree of consumption by minors is sufficient to constitute a
valid cause of action.
103
In Alumni, there were no allegations that either the fraternity or
the University was involved in the planning, serving, supplying or
purchasing of liquor for events of December 7, 1983.10° In fact, the
supreme court found appellees' conduct was insufficient to estab-
lish them as social hosts for the purpose of finding potential
liability.105
334 (codified 18 Pa Cons Stat Crimes and Offenses (Purdon 1983)).
97. See Congini, (cited in note 69).
98. The offensive act of the minor is covered under section 6308, which prohibits,
inter alia, the possession of intoxicating beverages by a person less than 21 years of age. 18
Pa Cons Stat § 6308 (Purdon 1983).
99. See Congini, Fassett, Macleary, and Orner, (cited in notes 69, 81, 86 and 91
respectively).
100. See Fassett, (cited in note 81).
101. Alumni, 572 A2d at 1210. See note 52 for similar reasoning.
102. Id at 1212.
103. See Fassett and Macleary, (cited in notes 81 and 86 respectively).




In finding no basis for liability to exist, the supreme court illus-
trated that there were strong public policy reasons not to broadly
interpret the liability standard to include Sigma Chi and
Bucknell.as One strong policy concern was the modern perception
of the relationship between a university, and its students, as well
as the fraternal organizational relationship. This relationship is to-
tally antithetical to the heightened duty (i.e.-"should have
known") importuned by claimants against social hosts.107 The
court was also persuaded by the obvious increase in cost which the
proposed duty would require of these developmental
institutions.108
Alumni clearly articulated the judicially developed standard that
was to be applied to social hosts involved in allegations of serving
alcohol to minors. The "knowingly furnish" standard was both rea-
sonable and effective, and was within the spirit of the legislation,
which was meant to severely limit liability for social hosts. The
judiciary determined that adults owed a duty of care to those per-
sons the state had determined incapable of handling the effects of
alcohol, here persons under the age of 21. The imposed duty was
for adults not to actively provide or "knowingly furnish" alcohol to
minors.
The current status of a social host standard for the serving of
alcohol to minors is more complicated and less certain. On March
25, 1988, Act 31109 was signed into legislation. Section 6310 of the
Crimes Code was amended,110 which may now significantly change
the "knowingly furnish" standard developed by the judicial branch
of Pennsylvania.




109. 1988, March 25, PL 262, No 31 § 11. Act 31, also known as 1988 House Bill 668,
was codified (in sections pertinent to this note) at 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 6310-6310.6
(Purdon 1990 & Supp). Act 31 deals with a large array of topics, ranging from drug traffick-
ing to minors, to alcohol related offenses. Id. As a House Bill, the act had a long voyage
through the General Assembly. For legislative remarks, see 1987 Pa House Journal 1817-37;
1988 Pa Senate Journal 1780-1819; 1988 Pa House Journal 357-76; and 1988 Pa Senate
Journal 1937-8.
110. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 6310-6310.6 (Purdon & 1990 Supp) Six additional sub-
sections were added to section 6310, as 6310.1-6310.6, which greatly affect the duty owed to
minors.
111. Section 6310.1 Selling or furnishing liquor ... to minors
(a)OFFENSE DEFINED.-. .. a person commits a misdemeanor... if he . . . intention-
ally and knowingly furnishes.. . any liquor or malt or brewed beverages to a person
who is less than 21 years of age.
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liability, and thus a duty, for those persons who sold or intention-
ally and knowingly furnished any liquor or malted or brewed bev-
erage to a person less than 21 years of age."1' This section, inde-
pendent of any other section, appears to reiterate the the standard
previously judically established.
The most significant and substantial change was in the creation
of section 6310.6,113 which provided definitions. Specifically, the
legislature defined furnishing as supplying, providing to, or al-
lowing a minor to possess on the premises or property owed or
controlled by the person charged.""
Reading both section 6310.1 and section 6310.6 together, it
seems that the "knowingly furnish" standard which was judicially
developed, and applied in Alumni may be insufficient and inade-
quate in light of the recent legislative definition of the word "fur-
nish". It could be argued that the broad interpretation of furnish,
which the appellant sought and was refused in Alumni, has been
legislatively adopted. The legislative standard may be interpreted
to have greatly increased the duty owed to minors by adult social
hosts. Some may contend, through a plain reading of section
6310.6, that a property owner will now be deemed to have a legal
duty to prevent alcohol from being possessed by a minor on the
premises which he owns or controls. These contentions must fail.
While the legislative action was within the power of the legisla-
ture, such a broad interpretation would be excessive and improper.
The standard developed by the judiciary, and utilized by the su-
preme court in Alumni was sufficient and effective. The broad in-
terpretation of the recent legislation would clearly develop a higher
standard of care for property owners. In essence, the new standard
would impose strict liability upon property owners. Imposing this
new standard to large property owners, such as universities and
fraternities, is essentially imposing strict liability since these own-
ers and controllers of land do not have the staff or the facility to
carry out such an enormous task of ensuring that there is no alco-
hol being consumed on their premises.
At no point in the legislative remarks was there any discussion
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6310.1 (Purdon 1990 & Supp).
112. Id (emphasis added).
113. Section 6310.6. Definitions
"Furnish." To supply, give or provide to, or allow a minor to possess on the premises
or property owned or controlled by the person charged.
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6310.6 (Purdon 1990 & Supp).
114. Id (emphasis added).
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of imposing a greater burden/standard on property owners.
Clearly, it could be argued that any legislation developing a signifi-
cant change in the current standard would have been discussed;
and therefore, in the absence of such discussions, it is obvious that
such a result was not intended by the legislature. A much more
proper and effective interpretation of Act 31, specifically sections
6310-6310.6, would essentially leave the standard unchanged.
It is possible that courts may have the opportunity to interpret
the word "allow" in the legislative phrase, "allow a minor to pos-
sess. . ." to retain the preferred Alumni standard. The judicial in-
terpretation should be very narrow, and limit the duty adult social
hosts owe minors. The duty should remain a duty not to knowingly
provide alcohol to minors. This duty can be enforced by a strong
reading of section 6310.1 which requires an intentional act to cre-
ate criminal liability. The duty should not be so broad as to re-
quire land owners to prevent underage persons from possessing al-
cohol on the premises they own or control.
While the higher standard is less offensive when applied to sin-
gle family dwellings, the standard violates all logic and respectabil-
ity when applied to large institutions, such as universities or fra-
ternities. Therefore, while it is the job of the judicial branch to
interpret the meaning and determine the intent of the legislature,
it is strongly recommended that the recent definition of furnish
should be narrowly construed to require some active knowledge,
similar to the duty and standard utilized in Alumni.
In conclusion, the standard of care judicially developed and uti-
lized in Alumni was efficient and proper. A cause of action should
only be sustained against a social host when there are allegations
that the social host "knowingly furnished" alcohol to minors. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania prudently and correctly refused to
broaden the standard from "knowingly furnished" to "should have
known". The recent legislative definition of "furnish" should not
be interpreted to impose a higher duty of care on property owners.
Such an interpretation would be excessively broad and would cre-
ate a colossal duty on large societal institutions.
Jeffrey J. Bresch
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